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I see faces: popular pareidolia and the proliferation of meaning 
JOANNE LEE  
In recent times it has been hard to avoid the contemporary fascination for ‘pareidolia’, that 
curious act of facial recognition performed upon everyday things and places, when variously 
smiling, perplexed or grimacing faces are identified in such unlikely objects as cheese graters, 
parking meters or coat hooks. Such instances are often shared online via specific sites, blogs 
and social networks using an #iseefaces hashtag; British comedian Dave Gorman has an 
amusing Flickr pool devoted to the matter, and photographer Francois Robert produced a 
best-selling calendar featuring pictures of the ‘faces’ he discerned amongst mops, sockets and 
hinges. That the phenomena also appeared in the 2013 Venice Biennale – when examples 
from surrealist Roger Callois’ collection of ‘pictorial stones’ were exhibited, which included 
amongst their number an agate wherein emerges the form of a ghostly little creature to which 
had been assigned the name Le Petit Fantôme – demonstrates something of its enduring 
interest to artists and scholars of aesthetics, alongside those who find such stuff merely 
diverting. 
Pareidolia – the term originates from the Greek ‘para’ (παρά - beside or beyond) and 
‘eidōlon’ (εἴδωλον - form or image) – occurs when we perceive ‘meaning’ in random source 
material, as a result of the human visual system’s tendency to extract patterns from ‘noise’. It 
isn’t just faces we see – we spot animals in the shapes of billowing clouds, letter forms in 
stones, and the outline of familiar countries or islands in mere marks on the wall. The 
tendency isn’t only visual but occurs in sound too: Leonardo da Vinci described hearing 
names and words conjured in the sound of bells, and when John C. Lilly recorded the word 
‘cogitate’, looped it and played it back repeatedly, his several hundred listeners identified 
over 2000 different words and phrases amidst the resulting audio. Having come to remark the 
sheer number of posts devoted to the subject within contemporary popular culture online, I 
found myself thinking about the human desire to read into things, and about the way such 
interpretations are subsequently treated. As an artist-researcher working with the everyday, I 
have realized that I am committed to a project to enlarge what can be generated from the 
ordinary objects and materials that surround us, rather than coming to definitive 
interpretations, as might ‘normally’ be the case in other disciplines. I have become interested 
therefore in the propriety of what it is possible to think, and in what happens if these ‘possible 
thoughts’ are pursued creatively and critically. 
My desire for enabling a richer panoply of interpretive routes takes up Michel 
Foucault’s assertion that as academics we are suffering from “channels that are too narrow, 
skimpy, quasi-monopolistic, insufficient”, and his suggestion that “we must multiply the 
paths and the possibility of comings and goings” (Foucault 1996, 305). It also responds to 
Gerald Raunig’s more recent criticism of research in the current university regime through 
which “wild and transversal writing” is tamed by being fed into the “creativity-destroying 
apparatuses of disciplining institutions” wherein researchers are subjected to the ‘fetish of 
method’ and required “to squeeze the last vestiges of their powers of invention into the 
straitjacket of the essay industry” (Raunig 2013, 35). 
 My own attempt to multiply possibilities and to wriggle free from the institutional 
straitjacket, is made through an independent serial publication, the Pam Flett Press, Issue #5 
of which, I see faces, specifically considers pareidolia as a kind of process and metaphor for 
the generation of meaning and interpretation, a method which opens up routes for critical and 
creative work. (See Endnote.) Whilst I came to know of the term pareidolia through the 
proliferation of online sites devoted to recording and sharing the phenomena, I realize that my 
first encounter took place long before this, thanks to the patterned Anaglypta wallpaper of my 
childhood bedroom: in those twilight minutes before I slept, I’d see devilish or comic faces 
emerge as I gazed absently at the pattern of raised swirls… .Years later and I was still 
preoccupied by such things: having stripped the paper from a house during renovations, I 
found myself drawn to the strange faces formed out of scuffed and stained plaster, and rather 
than having attended, as I ought, to the necessary redecoration, instead I spent hours with a 
pen, recording their variety in a series of drawings. 
 
The propensity for pareidolia seems to go back a very long way in human history. 
There is, for example, the Makapansgat pebble, a river-worn stone whose naturally formed 
contours resemble crude eyes and a mouth; it was found associated with an australopithecine 
burial in South Africa, many miles away from what would have been its original source. 
Whilst it is impossible to know how this stone was viewed or interpreted at the time, and what 
were the perceptive and cognitive capabilities of such beings, thanks to its apparently 
purposeful relocation archaeologists have hypothesized that it may well have been recognized 
as a face, and that this seemed to have some significance for the hominids concerned (Dart 
1974). 
 
The ability and desire to perceive ‘meaning’ in random source material has been a 
regular human occurrence. It can be discerned via the countless references in literature and 
art. Take for example the act of seeking and finding shapes in cloud forms – nephelococcygia 
– which is recorded in Aristophanes’ play The Birds, when its characters erect a perfect 
imaginative city (so-called cloud cuckoo land); or how Shakespeare has Hamlet toy with 
Polonius as he points out a cloud he at first claims might resemble a camel, then a weasel and 
finally a whale. (The Simpsons surely riffs on this with a scene in The Telltale Head, in which 
clouds ‘start looking like stuff’ – variously a cherry bomb, a guy with a switchblade stuck in 
his back, a school bus going over a cliff in flames with kids inside screaming, and the statue 
of Springfield founder Jebediah Springfield - without the head, of course…) (The Simpsons 
1990) Dario Gamboni’s Potential Images offers a compendium of artists and thinkers inspired 
by sky gazing: he lists Piero di Cosimo looking at the sky for pictorial inspiration; Novalis 
writing of figures forming therein; Denis Diderot desirous of leaving the imagination free 
“like children seeing shapes in clouds”, and Odilon Redon’s reminiscence of his father’s 
instruction to see in the changing shapes “apparitions of strange, fantastical and marvelous 
beings” (Gamboni 2002, 69). 
 
Gamboni notes how such tendencies have long been used by artists as triggers for creative 
work.  One eleventh-century treatise by Chinese painter Sung Ti  suggests that the artist use 
an old tumbledown wall spread with piece of thin white silk and “gaze at it until at length you 
can see the ruins through the silk, its prominences, its levels, its zig-zags and its cleavages, 
storing them up in your mind and fixing them in your eyes. Soon you will see men, birds, 
plants and trees, flying and moving among them. You may then ply your brush according to 
your fancy” (Gamboni 2002, 24). Leonardo da Vinci’s Treatise on Painting famously 
recommended artists look at rock formations, walls and stained surfaces, as well ashes, 
clouds, mud and other seemingly unlikely sources in order to inspire landscapes, scenes, men 
and animals, devils and monsters: “If you have to invent some scene, you can see there 
resemblances to a number of landscapes, adorned in various ways with mountains, rivers, 
rocks, trees, great plains, valleys and hills. Moreover, you can see various battles, and rapid 
actions of figures, strange expressions on faces, costumes, and an infinite number of things, 
which you can reduce to good, integrated form” (Da Vinci 1956, i, 50-1; 35v, para 76). 
During the Renaissance actual ‘pictorial stones’ seeming to depict strange cities and 
landscapes were collected and enjoyed as works in themselves; in some cases they were 
further developed by an artist, worked up with additional overpainting, as in Johann König’s 
1632 The Last Judgement and Crossing of the Red Sea, paintings in which the agate itself 
variously makes up the cloud formations or the tumultuous sea from which painted figures 
emerge.  
Alexander Cozens’ 1785 A New Method of Assisting the Invention in Drawing 
Original Compositions of Landscape suggested the artist: “Possess your mind strongly with a 
subject” and “with the swiftest hand make all possible variety of shapes and strokes upon 
your paper” in such a way that was unpremeditated, unguided and unconscious. (Oppé 1952, 
173) The painter should then study the shapes until some ‘proper meaning such as the blot 
suggest’ has been produced, ‘taking care not to add anything not suggested by it, and leave 
out what appears to be unnatural’. (173) Cozens relates how he had stumbled across his idea 
upon pulling out a dirty piece of paper upon which to demonstrate something to a student, and 
had found the preexisting marks thereon had helped him to crystallize an idea.  
 
By the early twentieth century, with representational orders called into question, artists were 
interested once more in potential images, ambiguity and interpretability: as a child Paul Klee 
was obsessed with the grotesque creatures he saw in the marble tabletops at his uncle’s 
restaurant, and Salvador Dali gazed at the stained ceiling of his school where he found 
detailed images he imbued with personality. Whilst the art historian H. W. Janson resolved 
artistic approaches as definitively falling either into mimesis – artists ‘discovering’ what 
nature put there – or fantasia – as when artists actively read into or interpret vague forms, 
perhaps in clouds or flames – Marina Warner considers this too stark a binary categorization 
given that mimesis “depends on a language of signs that is rooted in the world of the 
imagination with analogy, metaphor, and associations” (Warner 2006, 108). She describes 
how in the effort to figure the unseen, when artists thought they were looking empirically at 
hidden forms they were in fact being led by their fantasia, which in turn was shaped by 
“diverse, buried codes of cognition and communication” (108). 
 
Pareidolia is not just of interest to artists: it continues to recur in religion. Following a 
1992 apparition experienced by one Anita Contreras, the image of Our Lady of Guadalupe 
was ‘seen’ in the bark of an oak tree in a park in Watsonville, California. (Carroll 2015). 
Years later Contreras’ cousin Elvira Mendoza de Vidales continued to maintain the shrine 
each day, pointing out the shape to visitors with the aid of a tilted mirror; she said she had 
come to see other sacred images in trees and on the ground. In Chicago, Obdulia Delgado told 
friends she had seen the Virgin Mary in the salt stains that had appeared on the wall of a 
concrete viaduct; by the following day a group of faithful had gathered at the site, which 
turned in time into a small shrine with flowers and votive candles. (Zorn 2006). Muslims too 
have claimed to see the name of Allah spelt out in Arabic in a host of unprepossessing 
locations and objects – the brown and white pattern of a lamb’s coat, within the seedy interior 
of an aubergine, the scales of a fish… .   
These days many people enjoy poking fun at the devout – whatever their creed – who 
believe themselves to have seen signs of their faith in some everyday object or surface. The 
web post 50 Objects That Look A Little Like Jesus is typical of this in the way it sneers at the 
possibility of seeing the saviour’s face in unlikely places: its extensive list includes a glass of 
chocolate milk, the patterns on a small turtle’s shell, the brown patches of a discoloured grape 
or the skin of a bruised banana, in grease on a burger grill, and the burnt residue on the 
bottom of an iron, as well as in stains on the floor, swirls of paint on a wall and the knots in 
timber doors and planks… (Burns 2011). For the most part such found forms and imagery are 
these days considered mere curiosities or a momentary amusement, their significance often 
restricted to the potential of an object to generate media coverage or financial reward. Myrtle 
Young of Fort Wayne, Indiana, became famous via her appearances on the Johnny Carson 
and David Letterman shows for the collection of potato crisps in which she had distinguished 
the faces and shapes of a host of creatures, famous people and cartoon characters – there were 
horses' heads, dogs and ducks, a sleeping bird, Mr Magoo, Yogi Bear and Mickey Mouse, 
Bob Hope and George Bush (these last rather dating their discoverer to a particular era of 
television viewing…). People have claimed to see the likeness of Kate Middleton in a 
jellybean, Elvis in a piece of toast and Mother Teresa in a cinnamon bun. This last, the 
‘miracle nun bun’ as Nashville coffee shop owner Bob Bernstein termed it, spawned printed 
mugs and a range of other products until Mother Teresa’s lawyers told him he did not have 
permission to use her image for commercial purposes and he withdrew them from the market. 
(Bernstein 2004). More recently, one sports fan thought he spotted Rory McIlroy’s face in a 
Danish pastry: as a result, Rob Price bet on the golfer’s performance in the 2014 US Masters 
tournament and though McIlroy did indeed have a hugely successful year, scooping two 
major titles, unfortunately the Masters wasn’t amongst them. (Fearon 2014). Perhaps Price 
should have had a little more patience and waited a while for his pay-off: he could have 
followed the example of Florida’s Diane Duyser who, upon ‘recognising’ an image of the 
Virgin Mary in her grilled cheese sandwich, kept her culinary-religious treasure in a 
Tupperware container for some ten years before deciding to auction it on eBay; it went on to 
make her $28000, having been bought by internet casino Goldenpalace, who planned to tour 
it internationally. (BBC News 2004) 
 
Some are concerned to disavow the misperceptions of what they consider to be such 
gullible types. As its name indicates, Phil Plait’s Bad Astronomy website normally specialises 
in debunking myths and misconceptions about astronomy, but his sceptical blog post 
occasioned by ‘discovering’ Lenin’s face in stains on his shower curtain, causes him to reflect 
upon the long history (and enduring contemporary fascination for) humans seeing faces and 
creatures in inanimate objects. (Plait 2003). He reminds us that the astronomical 
constellations were named for the mythological figures they were said to resemble, and goes 
on to remark how, when photographs of the Eagle nebulae were released, many rushed to say 
they had discerned the face of Jesus in its cloudy masses. Whilst he admits that if you stand 
back and squint it vaguely resembles the way Jesus is represented in Western art, he is quick 
to counter: “Of course, it's not Jesus, it's just a random swirl of gas in a cloud 7000 light years 
away.” With our human ability to see patterns in random material, he says that if he 
scrutinizes the Hubble pictures he could also spot a Scottish Terrier sitting up and begging, as 
well as a couple of cats, a buffalo, a bird, and several more faces besides.  
Of course, all interpretations are culturally particular, and depend a great deal upon the 
society in which we live, the artefacts within our knowledge or experience (a person would 
not see a ship in a cloud if they had no knowledge of what a ship is, or looks like) and how we 
have learnt to see and think via the representational traditions of our society (when Americans 
look at the moon they tend to see the face of a man, whilst East Indians see a rabbit, Samoans 
a woman weaving and the Chinese a monkey). As Marina Warner points out in her own 
reference to the varying patterns found by different cultures in the random scattering of stars, 
people have tended to begin with the same salient constellations, but to interpret them in 
diverse ways: Babylonian and Egyptian traditions were adopted by European astronomers, 
and became the dominant way of naming of groups of stars, but the Amerindian peoples saw 
alternative stories and characters – for the Barasana people the zodiac includes such 
evocatively named combinations as the Old Adze, Poisonous Snake, Caterpillar Jaguar, 
Scorpion, Big Otter, Fish Smoking Rack, Foam Egret, Large Umari Fruit Fence, Headless 
One, Armadillo, the Small Otters, and the Corpse Bundle… (Warner 2006, 108). 
 
Although familiar stellar groupings seem so fixed in Western astronomy, during the 
Early Modern period a veritable ‘constellation mania’ saw astronomers ‘discovering’ a host of 
star figures which they then named for patrons and famous people of the time, motivated 
apparently by political or financial ambition: in 1679 one Augustin Royer proposed a group 
of stars in the form of a sceptre and hand in honour of Louis XIV, and in 1684 Gottfried 
Kirch spotted the crossed swords of the Electors of Saxony and named the constellation for 
Leopold I. Later, around the 1800s, stargazers saw manifestations in the form of 
contemporary technological developments – a hot air balloon, an electric generator, a printing 
office and Herschel’s Large Telescope number amongst those spotted… . None of these 
survived the International Astronomical Union’s designation of eighty-eight key formations: 
at this point over one hundred star ‘patterns’ were ‘eradicated’. For artist Julia Christensen, 
via whose project I encountered these examples, this shows that such patterns ‘are nothing 
more than manifestations of the imagination, constructs we dream up to help us navigate the 
vast cosmos in which we dwell’ rather than some type of fact to be discovered and verified. 
(Christensen 2014, 45). 
That Gaston Bachelard rather neatly described the constellations as “the Rorschach 
test of infant humanity” brings me to remark too on the famous test mobilized in psychiatric 
medicine, when patients responded to apparently abstract information contained in a 
collection of ink stains, with their response interpreted in turn by a trained clinician, working 
to a sanctioned method (Bachelard 1943, 202). In Rorschach the psychologist becomes “the 
rational interpreter of irrational interpretations” but also practicing an art, investigating a 
phenomenon situated at the uncertain boundaries “where the actual shape of the self and the 
shape the world presents to it are hard to distinguish” (Starobinski 1958, 190). The 
technique’s origins in the parlour game of ‘klecksography’, when players took turns to drip 
ink and fold paper in order to see what figures emerged, reveals the conjunction of play and 
imagination at work with interpretation; this is surely there too in paediatrician and 
psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott’s ‘squiggle game’, where a series of additive drawings, 
accompanied by dialogue about their potential meanings, would allow Winnicott to converse 
through drawing with those young patients who found it hard to put into words the difficulties 
they were feeling. (Berger 1980). 
This relationship of psychiatry and psychoanalysis to the interpretation of abstract data 
continues in those forms of mental illness in which sufferers find meaningful patterns in ways 
that are not sanctioned. In such cases, contrary to certain popular conceptions of what it is for 
someone to be ‘mad’, it’s not that things don’t make sense, but rather that they start to make 
too much of it: things mean to excess. Such sensations were recognised by Klaus Conrad as 
marking the onset of delusional thinking in psychosis when sufferers begin to “repetitively 
and monotonously experience abnormal meanings in their experiential field” (Mishara 2010, 
10). He characterized this as apophänie, inventing the neologism ‘apophany’ (from the Greek 
apo [away from] + phaenein [to show]), to describe how some psychotics initially experience 
delusion as revelation, but the insights they have as a result are only self-referential, 
solipsistic and paranoid. August Strindberg’s Inferno gives a sense of this: “There on the 
ground I found two dry twigs, broken off by the wind. They were shaped like the Greek letter 
for ‘P’ and ‘y’. I picked them up and it struck me that these two letters P-y must be an 
abbreviation of the name Popoffsky. Now I was sure it was he who was persecuting me, and 
that the Powers wanted to open my eyes to my danger” (Strindberg 1962, 68-9). 
  
If seeing patterns in sticks is a sign of paranoia in some, for certain others - 
paranormal researchers, for instance – it may designate a way of tracking the mysterious 
‘Bigfoot’: in Lisa Shiel’s Backyard Bigfoot: The True Story of Stick Signs, UFOs and the 
Sasquatch, she notes sticks arranged in meaningful and distinctly unnatural displays, which 
she considers the vehicle for their non-verbal communication (Shiel 2006).  I’m in no position 
to comment on the legitimacy or sanity of Shiel’s work, but I’m interested to think how 
skilled hunters also read into the disposition of sticks and other debris on a forest floor in 
order to determine the passage or presence of animals of various sorts, and I wonder if matters 
here relate to a question of what it is proper and acceptable to look for at a given cultural 
moment?  
Neuropsychologist Peter Brugger draws upon Strindberg’s experiences in a paper 
about the role of the brain in the ‘pattern recognition’ of creative people, scientists, people 
with paranormal beliefs, and those suffering psychotic episodes. Brugger delineates a 
continuum, which has detection of real patterns at one end, and the ‘hypercreative’ 
interpretation of patterns in ‘noise’ at the other. Brugger notes “[t]he ability to associate, and 
especially the tendency to prefer ‘remote’ over ‘close’ associations, is at the heart of creative, 
paranormal and delusional thinking” (Brugger 2001, 196) and notes that the readiness to see 
connections between unrelated objects or ideas is what “most closely links psychosis to 
creativity” (205). Like Conrad, he suggests that a key symptom of psychotic experience is “a 
heightened awareness of the meaningfulness and personal relevance of any event together 
with the absolute conviction that no two things in the world are devoid of meaningful 
connections” (204). He quotes the testimony of two people who had encountered such 
sensations in their own psychotic breakdowns. For the first: “Every single thing “means” 
something. This kind of symbolic thinking is exhaustive… . I have a sense that everything is 
more vivid and important; the incoming stimuli are almost more than I can bear. There is a 
connection to everything that happens – no coincidences. I feel tremendously creative” 
(Brundage 1983, 584). And for the second: “My trouble is that I have too many thoughts. You 
might think about something, let’s say that ashtray and just think “Oh! yes, that’s for putting 
my cigarettes in,’ but I would think of a dozen different things connected with it at the same 
time” (McGhie and Chapman 1961, 108).  
For Brugger, the ability to see patterns and make connections is a hallmark of the 
creative mind in any field, but he distinguishes between the practices of art and science, 
suggesting that the arts can acknowledge and take advantage of the “purely subjective aspect 
of perceiving”, whilst by contrast, “scientific creativity requires not only the ability to detect 
patterns, but also the interpretation of their underlying cause”(205). He goes on to describe 
the potential errors to which the human mind is liable: “[i]ncorrectly assuming the presence of 
a pattern where, in fact, none exists, is labeled in the language of statistics a Type 1 error. In 
contrast, a Type 2 error refers to the incorrect conclusion that the data reflect ‘noise’ when a 
pattern is actually present” (205). In his  thinking through the relativity of creativity – which 
runs, he says, from the correct detection of existing patterns to discovering pattern where none 
exists – he wonders why the genetic aspect of a predisposition to psychosis persists despite 
what he considers are the disadvantages it presents the species, and concludes that: “The price 
for a protection against committing Type 2 errors is a susceptibility to commit Type 1 errors” 
(210). Brugger asserts: “As puzzling as it may read, a proper understanding of the world 
sometimes requires the successful inhibition of associations.” (207) Whilst Brugger 
repeatedly denigrates the projective imagination of psychoanalytic techniques, considering 
that they stray well beyond the ‘proper’ boundaries of interpretation, Marina Warner notes 
how diagnostic tools relying on such techniques lie at the heart of so many nineteenth and 
twentieth century attempts to interrogate the psyche/self including such disciplines as clinical 
psychology, psychoanalysis and the activities of literary and artistic Surrealism. Warner saw 
graphology, lie detection, Rorschach testing, psychometrics and the like as akin to those 
earlier Platonist traditions in which God’s messages were thought to be concealed in text, 
when a gifted ‘scryer’ could reveal the secret significance of cryptic material; she notes how 
both Freud and Jung had something of a divinatory practice in their discovery of unconscious 
symbols in dream imagery and art. As a result she writes: “When the name of Allah is found 
inscribed in the heart of an aubergine, or Jesus’ face in a burned tortilla, or pyramids on Mars, 
or the Virgin Mary in a tomato, or any such items beloved of organs such as the National 
Inquirer, and the world-wide web, we are not straying very far afield from rather more 
respected methods of interpretation, surprising as it may seem” (Warner 2006, 106-7).  
 
Warner makes the case that from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, “rather than 
discerning the activity of occult powers or revealing the hidden workings of divine 
providence, now the process tends to hold a mirror to the psyche of the subject” (Warner 
2006, 107). She goes on: “When we see what we think we see, this can tell us something 
about who we are”. At which point I find myself doing just that, using my fascination with the 
faces seen in stained walls, or in cheese graters and other such quotidian objects – as a means 
to figure and reflect on my own role and methodology as an artist-researcher, and the 
potential ‘knowledge’ generated as a result.  
 
In my own thinking through practice – essaying the everyday in writing, photography, 
print and audio – I want to credit the creative propensity, noted by Brugger, for making sense 
of data in ways usually considered improper in a serious inquiry. At art school I learnt to 
make connections between seemingly disparate aspects, between high and low, the popular 
and abstruse, the over familiar and the overlooked; to accommodate contradiction; and to read 
material in such a way that I could make new and mobile meanings from what is encountered. 
Museum director Christopher Woodward once suggested that whilst archaeologists see 
artefacts and sites as clues to a puzzle of which only one answer is correct, for artists, “any 
answer which is imaginative is correct” (Woodward 2001, 30). I am curious therefore, in the 
work I do, to test the effects of such an approach within the academy. 
 
I have come to think about the criticality of contradiction itself. Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger, whose “willingness to embrace contradictions […] always marked his 
approach”, according to David Blackbourn, took the essay as his favoured form, and he 
mocked those academics who “with an air of triumph accused the essayist of contradictions, 
just imagine — contradictions!” (Blackbourn 2010, 15). For the Hungarian writer Miklós 
Szentkuthy, the need for contradiction was explicit: “For me the most incomprehensible 
secret is how someone can keep writing or building on a subject in one style to the very end. 
To achieve that degree of consistency I would need to freeze into some sort of intellectual 
tetanus as I am in a constantly changing relationship to my subject, and that is the most 
fundamental reality” (Szentkuthy 1995 translated and quoted in Tompa 2013, 289). 
In terms of a constantly changing relationship to one’s subject matter, I saw how this 
desire has been echoed by others in recent thinking on interdisciplinary research: Paul Carter 
characterized such research as being like “the shuttle ducking and weaving across the warp” 
of a loom, recalling the “physical sense of running hither and thither” evoked by the word 
‘discourse’; for him the aim of this process is ”to materialise discourse itself” (Carter 2004, 
9). For Irit Rogoff, art itself is an interlocutor: “it’s the entity that chases me around and 
forces me to think differently” (Rogoff 2000, 10). She is clear that she is “trying to avoid the 
work being hijacked by some academic paradigm which would dictate a relation between 
objects and knowledge” (Rogoff 2000, 8).  
The shifting exploration is evoked too by the ‘semionaut’, that figure Nicolas 
Bourriaud identified as someone who invents paths through culture and signs. He claims that 
DJs, Web surfers and certain types of contemporary artist project new, possible scripts 
endlessly onto culture, and describes how: “When we start a search engine in pursuit of a 
name or a subject, a mass of information issued from a labyrinth of data-banks is inscribed on 
the screen. The ‘semionaut’ imagines the links, the likely relations between disparate sites” 
(Bourriaud 2005, 19). Bourriaud’s identification of a concern for ‘relations between disparate 
sites’ finally draws me back to one of the specific historical examples of pareidolia I 
mentioned earlier, the identification and naming of the constellations, and I want to use this as 
a means to figure an alternative to the linear academic thesis. I remembered how these 
imaginative manifestations had been mobilised by no lesser figure than Walter Benjamin in a 
powerful image for the historical work in which he was engaged. His metaphorical conception 
of the ‘constellation’ first appears in the prologue to his Origin of German Tragic Drama 
(1925) where he writes: “ideas are timeless constellations, and by virtue of the elements being 
seen as points in such constellations, phenomena are subdivided and at the same time 
redeemed” (Benjamin 2009, 34). In Benjamin, critical work is done in the connection between 
fragments and between different objects, registers and discourses… Norm Friesen connects 
Benjamin’s constellationary thinking with that of Siegfried Giedion and Marshall McLuhan, 
identifying “Juxtaposition and ironic counterposition across time and space [as] obviously 
modernist tropes” (Friesen 2013 under Conclusion: Redemption or Ricorso?). He considers 
such thought in relation to Mieke Bal’s idea of the ‘travelling concept’, which are elastic ideas 
or metaphors, offering “sites of debate, awareness of difference and tentative exchange” (Bal 
2002, 13).  
 
So whilst those online postings about faces seen in satchels, chairs, mops, foodstuffs 
and culinary utensils, alerted me to a phenomena that seemed at first merely humorous and 
diverting, the contemporary fascination revealed a longer human history of pareidolia and its 
role in creativity, religion, mythmaking, science, psychoanalysis and psychiatry. I came to 
understand that, as Howard Margolis’ classic work makes clear, “the brain has a bias 
favouring seeing something rather than nothing, so that it tends to jump to a pattern that 
makes sense of a situation” (Margolis 1987, 38-9) and indeed that there may be evolutionary 
advantages to humans via such a propensity (Brugger 2001, 210). But whilst Brugger 
suggests that this leads too frequently to erroneous conclusions, the continuum of 
interpretative responses to ‘data’ of various sorts is creatively and critically of interest to me. 
Artists, academics, paranormal researchers, psychoanalysts and the psychotic all have their 
differing take on what they think they see, and what they know as a result: I want to hold 
these perspectives in productive relation, rather than hierarchizing, or definitively 
categorizing these according to their propriety. 
 
Seen perhaps in terms of an immaterial illusion, pareidolia allows for richer, stranger readings 
of the everyday material we encounter. It in fact is a method with a long history that alters our 
perception and changes an approach to pattern recognition, interpretation, the generation and 
proliferation of meaning. Artistic research can make knowledge in the form of possibilities, 
but it is thanks to the very objects and their place in popular culture that my project and 
practice was itself rethought, and re-envisaged. By drawing together a critical constellation of 
references, responses and reinterpretations, I refigure what kind of knowledge I make, and 
what this can in turn make of me. Responding to Foucault’s recognition of academic skimpy 
insufficiency, and to Raunig’s desire for transversal, inventive writing within the university 
institution, I think of this work as the popular life of things creating their own complex 
agenda, the things think me. As a result I echo the aspiration of novelist William Gass: “you 
hope that the amount of meaning that you can pack into the book will always be more than 
you are capable of consciously understanding. Otherwise, the book is likely to be as thin as 
you are” (Gass quoted in Colter Walls 2013, 22). 
Endnote 
The Pam Flett Press – its name plays on the idea of the pamphlet and evokes those historical 
or contemporary connotations of political, religious or poetic pamphleteering – takes up the 
assertion credited to Andre Breton, and widely circulated amongst independent-minded 
makers that ‘one publishes to find comrades’ (quoted in Branwyn 1997, 52) The serial 
publication explores such phenomena as graffiti on urban walls, vacant lots that perforate the 
urban fabric, the ubiquitous plastic bag, the scatter of gum on city pavements, the pareidolic 
desire to see faces in ordinary objects, and through the activity of making (publications) 
becomes both a making-one’s-way-into-understanding the everyday, and an increasingly 
metacritical project in which the everyday as material in turn rethinks my academic and 
artistic work. It pursues an interest in the creative and critical possibilities of the essay form – 
recalling that etymologically ‘essay’ comes from ideas of trial, test and experiment (French 
speakers will know that essayer is ‘to try.’) That an essay can be made from diverse material 
suits both the attention to disparate everyday subject matter, and my own training in 
conceptual art when an appropriate form or material is sought for ideas rather than having a 
particular medium in mind in the first instance. An essay might certainly be written, but it 
could also be intended as audio, as in pieces for radio or internet podcasts; it could be visual, 
using photographic, film/video, or employing animation or sequential images; it might be a 
physical exhibition, where ideas can be disposed and unfold in physical space and time; or an 
interactive site online. My work with the Press was also motivated by Foucault’s call for “a 
new age of curiosity”, where one takes care “for what exists and could exist” and there is “a 
readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds us; a certain relentlessness to break up 
our familiarities and to regard otherwise the same things; a fervor to grasp what is happening 
and what passes; a casualness in regard to the traditional hierarchies of the important and the 
essential” and a need for “differentiation and simultaneity of different networks.” (Foucault 
1997, 305) It draws upon the insights and experiences of those within the academy that 
deliberately tarry in the vague terrains of practice, emerging from the apparently marginal 
grounds of scholarship where knowledge and knowing are themselves problematized, and 
multiple interpretations remain simultaneously and intentionally possible. (See Lee 2011a, 
2011b, 2013, 2015) 
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